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suggested ":hat a closed circuit television
arrangemem based on a 'case-specific finding of nece..sity' would be regarded as
impermissible under the Confrontation
Clause, that view was not shared by more
than four of the justices who sat on the
case." Id at 280, 544 A.2d at 798.
Therefore, the Craig court felt compelled by necessity to decide the issue of
exceptions to the confrontation clause that
the Supreme Court had chosen to reserve
for another day. The court, taking guidance from the Court of Appeals' of
Maryland analysis in Wildermuth and following Justice O'Connor's lead in her concurring opinion in Coy, held that:
(1) the requirement of a face-to-face
meeting in court is not absolute, but
does admit of exceptions; (2) where a
face-to-face meeting would, in fact, so
traumatize a child-witness as to prevent him or her from reasonably communicating, the State may provide for
the testimony to be taken in a setting
that, as nearly as practicable, preserves
all other aspects embodied in the right
of confrontation, but does not require
the witness to look directly upon the
defendant or to testify in his direct
physical presence; and (3) if § 9-102 is
implemented in the manner prescribed
by Wildermuth, the implementation
will not be deemed so violative of the
defendant's right of confrontation as
to constitute reversible error.

Id at 280-81, 544 A.2d at 799 (emphasis in
the original).
The procedure authorized in the
Maryland statute and used in this case did
not amount to the kind of face-ta-face confrontation that the Supreme Court held
was envisioned by the sixth amendment.
The child-witnesses testified from the
judge's chamber in the presence of a prosecutor, the lead defense attorney, and a
technician, while the judge and everyone
else remained in the courtroom. The proceedings were broadcast through a closed
circuit television setup, with Craig having
access to her attorney through a private
telephone line. The court of special appeals
conceded that if the confrontation requirement were absolute as interpreted by
Justice Scalia, the "procedure [used in
Craig] would not pass muster." Id at 281,
. 544 A.2d at 799. However, the court
emphasized that the requirement was not
so rigid since "neither the Supreme Court
nor the Maryland Court of Appeals-the
two courts that bind us-has ever held any
. aspect of the Confrontation Clause ... to
the absolute." Id
In Wildermuth, the court of appeals held
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that the right to face-to-face confrontation
was to be tempered by public policy considerations by which the state has a legitimate and compelling interest in
authorizing the procedure stated in section
9-102. Articulating that interest more specifically, the Craig court held that the state
has a two-fold interest in allowing the testimony of a child abuse victim to be given
over closed circuit television. Foremost is
the fact that if the child-witness is so
traumatized by the confrontation so as to
be unable to testify, the truth of the matter
may never be revealed. Secondly, the state
has a legitimate interest in protecting
children generally from such trauma. Id at
282-83, 544 A.2d at 800.
Craig's second argument was that the
trial court failed to follow the proper procedure stated in section 9-102. Citing Coy,
the court reemphasized that no individualized findings were made that the childwitnesses needed special protection in
providing face-to-face testimony when the
Supreme Court overturned that decision.
The court distinguished Wildermuth in
that that court's finding was based on testimony as to general perceptions on the difficulty children may have had testifying in
court with the alleged abuser's presence.
Id at 285, 544 A.2d at 801. In the instant
case, there was specific, focused testimony
on each child by trained personnel that the
child-witnesses would have extreme difficulty testifying in the presence of Craig
which satisfied the requirements of the statute.
Finally, the court addressed Craig's
assertion of right of presence. The Wilder·
muth court had also considered the argument that the closed circuit television
procedure authorized by section 9-102 vialated the defendant's common law and due
process right of presence, because the
witnesses and defendant were separated
during testimony. The Wildermuth court
rejected that contention since the defendant could hear the questions being asked
and answered, could see the proceedings,
and could readily communicate with his
attorney. Thus, the Wildermuth court held
that "[t]he statutory procedure did not
thwart a fair and just hearing in terms of
due process' and there was 'no violation of
[the defendant's] due process right to be
present.'" Id at 287-88, quoting Wilder·
muth, 310 Md. at 529, 530 A.2d at 291.
Craig had essentially the same setup and
was given ample opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses. Also, there was no
violation of the common law right of presence since it had been modified by statute.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland has carved out an exception in
the sixth amendment's confrontation

clause concerning child abuse cases. Citing
strong public policy and the state's legitimate interest in protecting children generally from abuse, the court has made a
strong statement in both upholding the
accused's rights but also protecting childwitnesses from being traumatized by the
courtroom experience.

- George L Cintron

Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical
Center: SURVIVAL ACTIONS BASED
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACCRUE UPON DISCOVERY AND
FRAUD STATUTE TOLLS TIME FOR
FILING WRONGFUL DEATH
ClAIMS
In Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical
Center, 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 658 (1988),

the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that a wrongful death and survival action,
based on medical malpractice, accrues
upon discovery of fraud and that Md. Cts.
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. 55-203 (1984
Repl. vol.) operates to toll the time for filing a wrongful death claim.
Plaintiff Elaine Geisz (Elaine), as personal representative of the estate of Steven
F. Geisz (Geisz) and as mother and next
friend of Steven Geisz, II, brought a survival action and a wrongful death claim
against Greater Baltimore Medical Center
(GBMC) and Dr. George J. Richards, Jr.,
alleging medical malpractice ten years after
Geisz died of Hodgkin's disease. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants finding that the survival action
accrued, as a matter of law, upon the death
of Geisz and that the Plaintiff failed to
show facts to support a finding of fraud to
toll the general three year statute of limitations to bring a wrongful death claim.
Assuming that the summary judgment
record could support a finding of fraud,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
nevertheless held that Elaine and Geisz
"by the exercise of ordinary diligence
should have discovered the fraud" more
than three years prior to the filing of the
wrongful death claim. Geisz v. GBMC, 71
Md. App. 538, 526 A.2d 635 (1987). The
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to address the issue of whether the
survival claim and the wrongful death
action were time barred pursuant to 55203.
In 1971, Geisz had been diagnosed as suffering from Hodgkin's disease and had
been referred to Dr. Richards, who was
chief of radiation therapy at GBMC. At
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that time, Dr. Richards informed Geisz
that there was a 95% chance of cure.
Thereafter, under the care of Dr. Richards,
Geisz began a treatment program of chemotherapy and radiation therapy. Despite
Dr. Richards' assurances that Geisz was
receiving the best care possible, Geisz's
condition steadily deteriorated. Dr.
Richards attributed Geisz's failure to
respond to treatment to Geisz being
among the 5% of patients who do not
improve. In 1975, Geisz died of Hodgkin's
disease. According to plaintifrs experts,
portal films should have been utilized in
order to determine the effectiveness of the
radiation therapy. But at no time during
the course of Geisz's treatment were portal
x-rays taken to show whether radiation
was reaching the intended treatment areas.
Ten years after Geisz's death, Elaine read
a newspaper article regarding malpractice
actions against Dr. Richards, and subsequently, instituted these actions. Elaine
contended that the survival claim did not
accrue until she had discovered the causes
of action in the newspaper article. With
respect to the wrongful death claim, the
plaintiffs submitted that Dr. Richard's
statements constituted fraud, within the
meaning of §5-203, and therefore, the time
in which to bring the action should be
measured from the discovery of the fraud.
The defendants countered that the
patient's death equated to an accrual for
purposes of the survival claim. They further argued that the three year period for
bringing the wrongful death claim should
be measured from Geisz's death.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first
addressed whether the plaintiffs exercised
due diligence to discover a cause of action.
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs
should have been aware of the malpractice
since Geisz's condition deteriorated, even
though the expected cure rate was 95%.
The court noted that Dr. Richards, in his
professional capacity at GBMC, assumed
the responsibility to provide and supervise
Geisz's treatment. Moreover, the plaintiffs
believed that Geisz was among the unfortunate percentage of patients who fail to
respond to treatment. Most important,
"cancer which was not responding to proper treatment, as contrasted with cancer
which was being negligently treated, could
have explained Geisz's deterioration and
death." Geisz at 317. Therefore, the court
concluded that the issue as to when the
plaintiffs should have discovered the survival claim should have been preserved for
a jury.
Next, the court addressed defendants'
contention that even if the plaintiffs did
not fail to exercise due diligence, the cause
of actiQn accrued upon Geisz's death.

First, the defendants relied on CJ S 5-101,
which provides that "a civil action at law
shall be filed within three years from the
date it accrues." Id By analogy to Trimper
v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31,501 A.2d 446
(1985), in which the court held that a survival action predicated on latent disease
accrued at death, the defendants argued
that a survival action based on medical
malpractice accrued at death. Id.
In response, the court looked at CJ S 5109, which beginning July 1, 1975, established that medical malpractice actions
"shall be filed (1) within five years of the
time the injury was committed or (2)
within three years of the date when the
injury was discovered, whichever is shorter." Id at 319. Notwithstanding that § 5109 does not govern the claim since Geisz's
injury occurred prior to its enactment, the
court used § 5-109 for guidance in deciding
the survival claim. Most persuasive was
that under § 5-109 a "claim which remains
undiscovered for more than three years
after the death of the patient may still be
brought if instituted within five years of
the injury."Id. As a result, death of the
patient has no impact on the limitations
under § 5-109. Id. Thus if a medical malpractice claim was predicated on an injury
prior to the enactment of § 5-109, then in
some instances the five year period for
undiscovered malpractice claims would be
shortened. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that the survival claim was not
barred under the discovery rule of the
general three year statute of limitations.
The court went on to consider whether
the wrongful death claim was timely filed.
In an issue of first impression, the court
discussed the applicability of C] § 5-203,
which provides:

"If a party is kept in ignorance of a
cause of action by the fraud of an
adverse party, the cause of action shall
be deemed to accrue at the time when
the party discovered, or by the exercise
of ordinary diligence should have discovered the fraud."

Id. at 322.
The court concluded that fraud or fraudulent concealment of the cause of action,
tolled the substantive limitations period in
the wrongful death statute, CJ § 3-904(g).
Finally, the court considered whether
there existed a factual issue that operated
to keep the plaintiffs in ignorance of a
wrongful death claim. Relying on Brack 'V.
Evans, 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963),
the court reiterated that the fraud element
of § 5-203 is satisfied when untrue representations are made with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. Id. at 331.

Since there was evidence that Dr. Richards
made representations about Geisz's condition without the requisite clinical data and
that it was possible that such statements
were false, § 5-203 was properly invoked.
For these reasons the court reversed the
summary judgment granted in defendants'
favor in order to preserve to the jury's
determination as to whether the plaintiffs
acted with diligence in view of the defendant's representations.
In summary, this case rep resents a significant step toward broadening the substantive interpretation of when a cause of
action accrues based on the peculiar facts
of a given case. Specifically, survival
actions based on medical malpractice do
not as a matter of law accrue upon death;
but rather, accrual depends on discovery
of the cause of action.

-Kelly Walfred Miller

A heart attack may start with pressure, fullness, squeezing or
pain in the middle of your chest. It
can spread to your shoulders,
neck or arms. Dizziness, fainting,
sweating and shortness of
breath may even occur. If you
experience any of these symptoms for more than two minutes,
call for emergency medical
help immediately. The longer you
wait, the more you risk dying.
Which can be very painful for
everyone who cares about you.
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